Share and Disperse: How to Resist Against Aggregator Compromises in
  Sensor Networks by Claveirole, Thomas et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
61
00
84
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 13
 O
ct 
20
06
Share and Disperse: How to Resist Against
Aggregator Compromises in Sensor Networks
Thomas Claveirole1, Marcelo Dias de Amorim1, Michel Abdalla2, and Yannis Viniotis3
1 LIP6/CNRS 2 De´partement d’Informatique 3 Department of ECE
Universite´ Pierre et Marie Curie – Paris VI ´Ecole Normale Supe´rieure North Carolina State University
Paris, France Paris, France Raleigh, NC, USA
{claveiro,amorim}@rp.lip6.fr michel.abdalla@ens.fr candice@ncsu.edu
Abstract— A common approach to overcome the limited nature
of sensor networks is to aggregate data at intermediate nodes.
A challenging issue in this context is to guarantee end-to-end
security mainly because sensor networks are extremely vulner-
able to node compromises. In order to secure data aggregation,
in this paper we propose three schemes that rely on multipath
routing. The first one guarantees data confidentiality through
secret sharing, while the second and third ones provide data
availability through information dispersal. Based on qualitative
analysis and implementation, we show that, by applying these
schemes, a sensor network can achieve data confidentiality,
authenticity, and protection against denial of service attacks even
in the presence of multiple compromised nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are computer networks
dedicated to monitoring physical conditions with the help of
sensor nodes [1]. They support a wide range of applications
including environmental and wild-life monitoring, building
security and home automation, traffic flow measurement, med-
ical care, and military operations.
In many applications of WSN, data may be sensitive to
external events that are not expected to happen under normal
operation of the network. In particular, data confidentiality and
availability are important characteristics the network should be
able to assure. Guaranteeing such characteristics is a tough
task, especially when the sensor nodes are composed of
inexpensive devices with limited hardware capabilities.1 In this
case, where providing tamper resistance is almost impractical,
compromising a node is an easy and attractive option for
attackers.
The limited nature of sensor nodes opens up possibilities
for multiple vectors of attack. Provided that radio commu-
nication is expensive in terms of energy consumption, it is
very important to reduce the communication overhead.2 An
interesting approach to achieve such an objective is to perform
data aggregation, where relaying nodes exploit the distributed
nature of the network and perform in-network processing.
Guaranteeing security in aggregation schemes is particularly
1It is important to note that sensors in WSN are not necessarily limited in
resources, although most problems become particularly challenging in such a
case.
2Transmitting 1Kb at a distance of 100 meters costs as much as executing
3 million instructions with a general purpose processor [2].
challenging because node compromises in such a scenario
are doubly problematic, both in terms data confidentiality
(eavesdropping) and availability (denial of service). Indeed,
by compromising an aggregator node3 the attacker would
endanger all of the readings that are part of the aggregate
the node is in charge of.
Several researchers have already studied the problem of
securing data aggregation. Mykletun et al. [3] suggest using
ciphers for which some arithmetical operations over cipher-
texts have some arithmetical signification on the cleartext.
While this technique allows for some security, a compromised
node may still stop aggregating and forwarding data. Even
worse, tampering and replay attacks cannot be detected with
such a solution. Przydatek et al. [4] propose a number of
techniques to ensure the integrity of the aggregated data
for some aggregation functions. Although integrity can be
satisfactorily assured, the proposed schemes are difficult to
implement and provide neither confidentiality nor protection
against denial of service (DoS) attacks. Hu and Evans [5]
propose a scheme that provides authentication and integrity
which is secure even when some nodes are compromised,
however it fails in the case where two consecutive aggregators
are compromised. Furthermore, this scheme neither addresses
confidentiality nor availability. Wagner [6] studies the inherent
security of some aggregation functions. But he only considers
the level of impact a compromised sensor may have on the
final result. His work concerns the security of aggregation
functions, not the aggregation security itself.
In this paper, we do not address data integrity as an explicit
issue. Instead, we focus on confidentiality and availability,
which we believe still lack efficient solutions. To this end,
we propose, analyze, and evaluate three new schemes, namely
(a) Secret Multipath Aggregation (SMA), (b) Dispersed Mul-
tipath Aggregation (DMA), and (c) Authenticated Dispersed
Multipath Aggregation (A-DMA). The main idea behind our
three approaches is to exploit using multiple paths toward
the sink. In fact, a sensor may split a handful of its readings
into n separate messages such that t messages are needed to
reconstruct the readings. By sending messages along disjoint
3That is, capturing an aggregator node and having access to its internal state
and cryptographic material. The attacker may therefore turn an authorized
node into a malicious one.
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paths, a sensor ensures that intermediate nodes do not have
complete knowledge of the sensed data. In such a scenario,
SMA guarantees confidentiality by applying the concept of
secret sharing [7]. DMA and its authenticated version, A-DMA,
address availability by dispersing information over the differ-
ent paths [8]. Although they have been recognized in many
research areas (e.g., parallel computing, distributed storage,
databases, and ad hoc networking), surprisingly neither secret
sharing nor information dispersal have been applied to the
context of wireless sensor networks nor to the specific problem
of data aggregation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the security and network assumptions
considered in the paper. In Section III, we introduce our
proposed schemes. In Section IV, we analyze their security
levels. In Section V, we provide further investigation on the
three schemes and compares them to other approaches. Finally,
in Section VI, we conclude the paper and present some open
issues.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the following, we describe the problems, goals, and
assumptions addressed in this paper. The section is composed
of three parts: (a) security aspects, (b) network assumptions,
and (c) node assumptions.
A. Security goals and threats
The goal of this paper is to provide aggregation schemes
that are resilient to node compromises. That is, a compromised
node alone should not be able to eavesdrop, tamper, or
forbid other nodes from accessing data. This paper assumes
that resistance against these attacks in the absence of node
compromise is ensured by link-level mechanisms [9], [10].
Even a single compromised aggregator node presents a
serious threat to a sensor network’s security. Therefore, some
schemes must be designed to ensure reasonable security in
the presence of compromised aggregator nodes. Ideally, one
would like the network security to degrade gracefully with the
number of compromised nodes. By security, in this article we
mean resistance against the following attacks: eavesdropping,
data tampering, packet injection, and denial of service. Other
attacks are out of the scope of this paper.
Eavesdropping. Eavesdropping occurs when an attacker com-
promises an aggregator node and listens to the traffic that goes
through it without altering its behavior. Since an aggregator
node processes various pieces of data from several nodes in
the network, it does not only leak information about a specific
compromised node, but from a group of nodes.
Data tampering and packet injection. A compromised node
may alter packets that go through it. It may also inject false
messages. Since an aggregate message embeds information
from several sensor nodes, it is more interesting for an attacker
to tamper with such messages than simple sensor readings. An
attacker that controls the meaning of the malicious messages
it sends may heavily impact the final result computed by the
sink.
An attacker that does not control the meaning of the mali-
cious messages (for example, if these messages are expected
to be encrypted with a key unknown to the attacker) still can
do some harm. It may send meaningless garbage values and
thus render the network unusable – this is also a form of DoS
attack. Finally, a particular type of packet injection consists
of replay attacks, where a malicious node eavesdrops some
packets in order to re-send them later.
Denial of service. A compromised node may stop aggregating
and forwarding data. Doing so, it forbids the data sink from
getting information about several nodes in the network. If
the node still exchanges routing messages despite its unfair
behavior, that problem may be difficult to solve. The compro-
mised aggregator may in this way render the network unusable.
Smarter attacks also involve dropping messages randomly. It
is also difficult to detect when an attacker sends garbage
messages. Finally, it is interesting to note that such attacks
do not necessarily involve a high cost or extended skills. For
example, a basic DoS attack may consist of simply physically
breaking the device.
B. Network assumptions
We assume that each sensor disposes of multiple paths
toward the sink and has link-level encryption capabilities.
A node can then split a flow into several distinct sub-flows
and send each one of them securely toward the sink. Due
to encryption, a node cannot eavesdrop a sub-flow unless it
belongs to the path for this flow.
In order to get multiple paths to the data sink, a solution
is to use a multipath routing protocol or disperse several
sinks geographically and communicate using fast and secure
links. Ganesan et al. [11] study the establishment of multiple
paths in sensor networks and Dulman et al. [12] explore the
relationship between the amount of traffic and reliability. Note
that schemes described in this paper require disjoint multipaths
to enforce optimal security. Non-disjoint multipaths may be
used, but optimal security cannot be guaranteed.
We also assume that the underlying routing protocol is
secure. In particular, attention must be paid to spoofing and
Sybil attacks [13]. Roughly speaking, this means that a node
should not be able to impersonate another node or to pretend to
be two distinct nodes. This should not be a problem however if
the link-level encryption keys are distinct amongst the nodes.
C. Node computational/memory assumptions
We assume that nodes have very limitedcomputation, mem-
ory and storage capabilities. This makes many cryptographic
algorithms and protocols impractical, if not impossible to use.
The proposed schemes were designed to work under such
constraints.
We implemented our schemes using the typical Crossbow
MICAz mote [14]. It uses an Atmel ATmega128L micro-chip
(8-bit CPU at 8 MHz) with 4 Kbytes of RAM and 128 Kbytes
of flash memory to store code and pre-computed program
data. Its energy is provided by two AA batteries (∼ 3V). It
communicates using a 2,4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 RF transceiver.
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Fig. 1. Proposed schemes basics. Nodes i and j respectively split their
readings into shares si,1, si,2, si,3 and sj,1, sj,2, sj,3. Shares are then sent
and aggregated on distinct paths.
III. RESISTING AGAINST AGGREGATOR COMPROMISES:
PROPOSED SCHEMES
Preliminaries. In this section we present three schemes to
achieve secure aggregation in sensor networks: Secret Mul-
tipath Aggregation (SMA), Dispersed Multipath Aggregation
(DMA), and Authenticated Dispersed Multipath Aggregation
(A-DMA). Each of these schemes has its own specific char-
acteristics. SMA offers strong confidentiality at the cost of
some communication overhead. DMA is optimal with respect
to radio communications but provides a little bit lower level of
confidentiality. A-DMA adds authentication to DMA also at the
cost of a slight overhead. All these properties are quantified
and analyzed in sections IV and V.
Basics. All the three proposed schemes use the same basic
principle: a sensor node splits its readings into several shares
and sends these shares over distinct paths. Each share makes
its way to the data sink. During forwarding, a share may be
processed by aggregator nodes. Once the sink has gathered
enough shares for a given set of readings, it can then recon-
struct this specific set of readings. However, a share alone is
not intelligible to an intermediate node. Figure 1 depicts this.
Tolerance to losses. The way shares are constructed depends
on the scheme (e.g., SMA’s encode only one reading per share
while both DMA and A-DMA encode multiple readings per
share). The number of shares transmitted and the number of
shares required for reconstructions are not necessarily equal,
which means that the system tolerates some losses during
forwarding.
Security implications. The abovementioned properties yield
two interesting security implications. First, an attacker must
compromise many nodes to be able to reconstruct readings.
This ensures confidentiality. Second, malicious nodes that stop
forwarding shares have limited impact on the system, since
another subset of shares may be used to reconstruct readings.
This ensures protection against DoS attacks.
Homomorphism. A key point of these schemes is their
homomorphic properties, i.e., the ability for aggregator nodes
to perform computations on shares despite their unknown
meaning. Say nodes i and j sense ri and rj . An aggregator
node may add up two shares from i and j, which gives a
corresponding share ri+rj . This holds for several aggregation
functions on the shared secret, such as sum, mean, variance,
and count [3], [6].
A. Scheme 1: Secret Multipath Aggregation (SMA)
SMA applies secret sharing to create shares, which is a
common approach when dealing with security under the
contingency of node compromise.
Share creation. Assume a node i may use p distinct paths to
reach the sink, t−1 (1 ≤ t ≤ p) of which may be compromised
(i.e., a node must have at least t shares to reconstruct the
reading). Upon reading a value ri, sensor node i chooses a
random t− 1 degree polynomial Pi(x) such that Pi(0) = ri.
One may construct such a polynomial by randomly choosing
ai,k, ∀k ∈ [1, t− 1] and using Pi(x) = ri + ai,1x+ ai,2x2 +
. . . + ai,t−1x
t−1
. This is a simple and practical operation.
Each of the p shares is then composed of the values Pi(q)
(1 ≤ q ≤ p). Node i sends then a message containing Pi(q)
along every path q.
Reconstruction. In order to recover ri, one must first recover
Pi using polynomial interpolation and then compute ri =
Pi(0). This operation requires at least t distinct shares. There
is an infinity of t−1 degree polynomials that pass through t−1
points. Thus, t− 1 compromised nodes cannot guess anything
about Pi and ri. Also, the sink may tolerate up to p− t non-
responding nodes and still be able to recover ri. Therefore, this
scheme provides some confidentiality and robustness against
denial of service attacks even in the presence of a few
compromised nodes.
Data aggregation. Assume an aggregator node along a path
q must fuse the readings of i and j, namely ri = Pi(0) and
rj = Pj(0). Being on path q, the only data it receives is Pi(q)
and Pj(q). It forwards Pi(q)+Pj(q) = (Pi+Pj)(q). The same
operation is performed on the other shares of these nodes over
the different paths. By receiving t samples, the sink may then
recover Pi + Pj and then (Pi + Pj)(0) = ri + rj . The result
also holds for multiplication and scalar division.
Discussion. Due to the inherent property of secret sharing,
SMA offers very strong confidentiality. An attacker that has
not gathered at least t shares cannot guess anything about
the sensor readings. The confidentiality assured by SMA is
obtained at the cost of some overhead in data transmission
and therefore energy consumption. Upon sensing an event, p
messages need to be sent, each one of them being of the same
size as the original reading.4 This is the main reason for which
two other schemes (DMA and A-DMA) are proposed.
4This is a well-known result of secret sharing that can be shown easily
using information theory.
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B. Scheme 2: Dispersed Multipath Aggregation (DMA)
Information dispersal is a common technique used to in-
troduce redundancy and protection against Byzantine failures.
Like secret sharing, it consists of a scheme that makes p shares
out of a particular data, such that t of them are needed to
reconstruct the data. Unlike secret sharing, a data block of
length t is split into t pieces of length 1.5
Share creation. Each sensor is pre-loaded with the same t×p
matrix A = [ai,q]. A should be chosen in such a way that
every combination of t columns should form an invertible
t × t matrix. When sensing events, a sensor i accumulates
its readings into an internal buffer of length t, considered as a
vector Ri =
[
ri,1 ri,2 . . . ri,t
]
. This forms a block
of readings. Once the buffer is full, the node is ready to
compute p different shares of length 1 to send along the paths.
These shares are the different elements of M = Ri.A, where
element mi,q of M is given by
[
mi,1 mi,2 . . . mi,p
]
=
[
ri,1 ri,2 . . . ri,t
]
·


a1,1 · · · a1,p
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
at,1 · · · at,p

 . (1)
That is:
mi,q = ri,1a1,q + ri,2a2,q + . . .+ ri,tat,q. (2)
Reconstruction. When the sink receives t shares, it is in
position of reconstructing the data. Assuming it receives
Mi =
[
mi,q1 mi,q2 . . . mi,qt
]
, readings are obtained
by resolving:


ri,1a1,q1 + ri,2a2,q1 + . . .+ ri,tat,q1 = mi,q1
ri,1a1,q2 + ri,2a2,q2 + . . .+ ri,tat,q2 = mi,q2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ri,1a1,qt + ri,2a2,qt + . . .+ ri,tat,qt = mi,qt
(3)
This may be done using a simple Gauss elimination method
or by inverting the matrix constituted of the different q1, . . . , qt
columns of A. If the matrix A is randomly chosen, no known
methods exist to reconstruct parts of the original data from
t− 1 samples, although some correlation between the various
ri,q may be deduced.
Data aggregation. This scheme has homomorphic properties
similar to secret sharing. Given messages mi,q and mj,q sent
by nodes i and j on path q, an aggregator node computes
mi,q +mj,q .
Since one has:
mi,q +mj,q =
t∑
k=1
(ri,k + rj,k)ak,q , (4)
5To avoid confusion: a length of 1 does not mean 1 bit, but a “unitary”
block of bits. Its size depends on the size of an aggregate.
then, upon reception of at least t such messages, the sink can
reconstitute every ri,k + rj,k in a way similar to the system
shown in Eq. 3:


(ri,1 + rj,1)a1,q1 + . . .+ (ri,t + rj,t)at,q1 = mi,q1 +mj,q1
(ri,1 + rj,1)a1,q2 + . . .+ (ri,t + rj,t)at,q2 = mi,q2 +mj,q2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(ri,1 + rj,1)a1,qt + . . .+ (ri,t + rj,t)at,qt = mi,qt +mj,qt(5)
Discussion. This scheme is space efficient, i.e., reconstructing
t readings requires only t shares of the same size. Using more
shares (p > t) allows however for protection against DoS
attacks.
Although the scheme is more efficient in terms of overhead
than SMA, one must keep in mind that this scheme offers a
weaker confidentiality than SMA. Compromising nodes allows
an attacker to get some information about readings, even
though partial readings cannot be reconstructed. This provides
however sufficient confidentiality for sensor networks. One
may therefore use this scheme to ensure loose confidentiality
and resistance to node failures or DoS attacks. Note that no
heavy computations need to be performed; only the sink has
to solve the system of equations.
C. Scheme 3: Authenticated Dispersed Multipath Aggregation
(A-DMA)
SMA and DMA as presented previously do not ensure pro-
tection from replay attacks nor data authenticity. A malicious
attacker may eavesdrop a sensor node and then send the
messages it listened to later. A malicious aggregator can
also send garbage bits instead of the result of an expected
computation and remain unnoticed. Of course, the sink may
detect such an attack by performing two reconstructions with
different sets of shares and notice the results are different. But
still it cannot decide which of the results is correct.
Authentication. There exist techniques for verifiable secret
sharing but they are currently impractical for sensor networks.
For this reason, we focus on an authentication solution for
DMA. We propose to replace the last reading of Ri with an
element that includes sequence information and depends upon
a secret shared among i and the sink. Let us assume Ri =[
ri,1 . . . ri,t−1 h(ki, s)
]
, where h(·) is a secure hash
function modeled as a random oracle [15], ki is a secret key
between i and the sink, and s is a sequence number.
Reconstruction. After the reconstruction of
∑
Ri, the sink
just needs to verify whether its last element is equal to∑
h(ki, s). If not, then an aggregator node is cheating and
the sink has to use another subset of messages to reconstruct∑
Ri. This is not to be considered as a strict integrity check
because the authentication value h(ki, s) does not gather
information from the readings ri,k. Therefore, an attacker
that has compromised t nodes might be able to reconstruct
h(ki, s) and tamper with the data without being noticed. But
using information from ri,k in the authentication value is
not possible because the sink does not know every ri,k: it
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only reconstructs
∑
ri,k . One may notice that the use of s
as a simple integrity check could be sufficient in practice.
However, we opted to use a secret key ki and a hash function
to make authentication values less predictable. This not only
complicates the action of tampering with the data but it also
seems to ensure a higher level of security in practice. By using
such a solution, one would lose however the space efficiency
of the scheme: reconstructing t−1 readings would imply using
t shares instead of t − 1. In order to minimize that overhead
a solution is to have blocks that contains more readings (by
increasing t). If this results in having more shares than the
number of paths available, one should use a large t and send
multiple shares on each path.
D. Summary and discussion
SMA splits each reading into a given number of shares
and sends then one share per path. DMA accumulates several
readings in an internal buffer before dispersing it into several
shares. It sends one share per path. A-DMA accumulates
several readings in an internal buffer, then inserts an authenti-
cation value into the buffer and disperses it into several shares,
possibly more than the number of available paths.
Each of these schemes has some advantages and drawbacks.
Some of them are global to all schemes, whereas some
others are specific. First, all techniques provide resilience to
unintentional failures and DoS attacks. Second, all techniques
hide (a varying amount of) data from aggregator nodes, so that
it is not possible for a few compromised nodes to reconstitute
the sensed data, at least completely.
SMA provides full confidentiality, i.e., no information leaks
from secret shares in the sense of information theory, unless
at least t of them are gathered, in which case the security
collapses completely. This strong security is obtained however
at the cost of duplicating each reading once per path. On the
other hand, both DMA and A-DMA are space efficient, although
each share leaks information about the readings. However, no
exisitng techniques are known to reconstruct, even partially,
sensor readings from t− 1 shares.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first recall that proper lower-level mechanisms can
protect a network in the absence of node compromises [16].
Protection from eavesdropping may be achieved with link-
level encryption. Data tampering and packet injection are also
inefficient when facing link-level authentication and encryp-
tion. Some physical-layer schemes and routing protocols may
get around denial of service. But none of these techniques can
protect the network from compromised nodes.
Security analysis in our case must be done with respect
to the number of node compromises. Each scheme disperses
sensed data along multiple paths. Most of the time, com-
promising a unique node is not sufficient for an attack to
succeed: there is a threshold that defines the minimum number
of nodes an attacker need to compromise in order to succeed
in attacking. Three fundamental questions are:
1) How many compromised nodes does an attacker need at
best to eavesdrop successfully and break confidentiality
for a given scheme? Also, which nodes should be
attacked?
2) What is the minimal number of nodes an attacker need to
compromise to inject false data into the network? Which
nodes should be chosen?
3) How many nodes need to be compromised at best in
order for an attacker to succeed in a DoS attack?
It is important to underline that an attacker might not have
the choice of which nodes to compromise. In practice, if n
nodes need to be compromised for an attack to succeed, the
attacker may not have access to all of these n nodes. Also, if
the attacker does not have full knowledge of the topology,
it may also be difficult to guess the interesting nodes to
compromise. It may be a requirement that an attacker needs
to compromise more nodes than the theoretical threshold.
In the following analysis, we assume without loss of gen-
erality that only one share is sent per path.
A. Eavesdropping
In this section we analyze the resilience the proposed
schemes offer to node compromise when facing eavesdropping
attacks (cf., Section II-A).
From the schemes, it appears that at least t nodes are
required to be compromised in order for a node to recover data.
However, there are some subtleties. First, such a consideration
holds for SMA because it does not leak any information until
all of the t shares are gathered. This is not the case for schemes
based on information dispersal. Second, nothing guarantees
that choosing t nodes from distinct paths allows an attacker
reconstructing some shares. Below we give explanations for
these two phenomena.
1) DMA and A-DMA information leakage: According to
information theory, due to the space efficiency of information
dispersal and since all of the p shares play a completely sym-
metrical role, each share contains exactly 1t of the readings.
Therefore, each share leaks some information and is then a
source of information for an attacker. No known methods are
known, however, to reconstruct parts of the readings from a
subset of less than t shares.
2) Possibility of data reconstruction with t compromised
paths: For the reconstruction operation to work properly, share
aggregates should contain contributions from the same nodes.
However, shares propagate on different paths, and among these
paths the aggregator nodes receive contributions from various
probably different nodes. This makes eavesdropping attacks
difficult to implement.
Here is an example. Suppose that t = 2 and an attacker has
succeeded in compromising two nodes i and j on two distinct
paths. If the shares gathered by i contain contributions from,
say, nodes k and l and shares gathered by j contain only
contributions from node k, then any reconstruction will be
impossible, though the attacker has compromised two distinct
paths. If shares gathered by j had contained contributions from
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both nodes k and l then the reconstruction would have been
possible.
B. Data tampering and packet injection
In this section we analyze the resilience the proposed
schemes offer to node compromises when facing data tam-
pering and packet injections (cf., Section II-A).
It is clear that an attacker that has compromised less than
t aggregator nodes has no effective control over the meaning
of the data it injects into the network. Even if the attacker
manages to compromise t nodes, nothing guarantees that the
sink would use the shares of all those t nodes to perform a
reconstruction (it may use shares from uncompromised paths).
One can also imagine a scenario where an attacker succeeds
in compromising one or several nodes on each possible path.
Still in this case, the attacker may not be able to control the
meaning of the injected/tampered data for the reason described
in IV-A.2.
Finally, since A-DMA provides an authentication check, an
attacker that is not capable of reconstructing some readings
(and therefore the authentication value for each sequence) has
little chance of being able to fool the sink with tampered
data. This because (a) the attacker does not know the expected
authentication values and (b) it will be extremely difficult for
the attacker to inject a share that would modify the readings
but not the authentication value after reconstruction.
Even without authentication, the sink may notice that some
data have been tampered if multiple reconstructions with
different subsets of shares give different outputs. In this case,
however, it cannot tell if there is a valid subset of shares for
reconstruction.
An attacker that cannot control the meaning of tampered
data can at best try to perform some kind of denial of service
attack. That is, it may try to tamper with enough messages
to make reconstruction impossible. In this case the security
parameters will behave as described in the following.
C. Denial of service attacks
In this section we analyze the resilience of the proposed
schemes when facing denial of service attacks (cf., Sec-
tion II-A).
There are two kinds of DoS attacks: those where attackers
stop emitting data (let us call it no-data DoS attacks) and
those where they send garbage data (let us call it garbage-
data DoS attacks). Garbage-data DoS attacks are more difficult
to handle. In the absence of data authentication, an attacker
needs only to compromise one path and send some garbage
data on it. In this case, the sink has multiple possible outputs
for reconstruction but cannot tell which ones are valid. In
the presence of data authentication, garbage-data DoS attacks
are indistinguishable from no-data DoS attacks — invalid
reconstructions are rejected as if the wrong share had never
arrived.
No-data and garbage-data DoS attacks in the presence of
authentication need to prevent the sink from gathering t valid
shares. Therefore, an attacker needs to compromise at least
TABLE I
LOWER BOUNDS ON THE NUMBER OF COMPROMISED NODES ONE NEEDS
TO SUCCEED IN VARIOUS ATTACKS.
Bound Comments
Eavesdropping t Compromised shares must have the
same contributing nodes.
Tampering⋆ t Compromised shares must have the
same contributing nodes.
DoS attack p − t+ 1 1 for garbage-data DoS attacks withSMA or DMA.
⋆ Only tampering where the attacker controls the meaning of its falsifications
is considered.
p− t+1 distinct paths, i.e., in the worst case, p− t+1 nodes.
If the attacker does not know the routing topology, it cannot
do anything but compromise random nodes. Therefore, it will
probably have to compromise more than p− t+ 1 nodes.
Let te and td be, respectively, the minimum number of
compromised nodes required to eavesdrop communications
and the minimum number of compromised nodes required to
succeed in a DoS attack. From previous sections, te = t and
td = p− t+ 1. Note that the higher te, the lower td. One can
make a tradeoff by choosing tp ≈
p+1
2
. Any higher values
would give better resistance to eavesdropping whereas any
lower values will give better resistance to DoS attacks. Making
a relevant choice is not easy when p is small (e.g., p = 3).
Table I summarizes the lower bounds on the number of
compromised nodes one needs to succeed under the different
attacks described above.
V. FURTHER INVESTIGATION
In this section we first present some other approaches and
compare them with our schemes concerning both communi-
cation overhead and resistance to attacks. We then present the
implementation details and some simulation results about the
performance of our schemes.
A. Comparison to other approaches
The common insecure approach regarding data aggregation
is to have one unique tree that spans every node. Each one of
the tree’s internal nodes aggregates data from its children be-
fore forwarding them to its parent. With one message per node,
this is the most communication-efficient technique despite the
complete lack of security. This aggregation method is referred
to as ‘simple tree’ hereafter. With no overhead, one can use
special encryption techniques that provide some confidentiality
and still allow for aggregation to be performed [3]. One can
also add different authentication mechanisms, but at the cost
of larger messages [5]. Table II summarizes the features of all
these schemes. As one can see, multipath aggregation schemes
provide more protection against node compromises.
Compared to SMA, DMA and A-DMA increase the delay
between the time readings are done and the time they are
reported to the sink. This is because a sensor node must
temporarily fill an internal buffer with its readings before
sending them to the sink. As an example, a sensor node that
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TABLE II
SCHEMES’ FEATURES.
Protection from. . .
Scheme eavesdropping tampering DoS attacks
simple tree no no no
Mykletun et al. [3] yes weak⋆ no
Hu and Evans [5] no yes no
SMA yes weak⋆ weak⋆⋆
DMA yes weak⋆ weak⋆⋆
A-DMA yes yes yes
⋆ An attacker may alter data but not control the altered message’s meaning.
⋆⋆ An attacker may succeed if she sends garbage data.
performs DMA and senses data every m minutes will send its
messages with an interval of t×m minutes. The first message
of the sequence must wait for other readings to fill the t-length
buffer before the information is dispersed and sent towards the
sink.
B. Communication overhead
A share has the same size as a unique sensor reading;
therefore, a message in such a scheme is not larger than a
message generated by the simple tree approach.
We define communication overhead as the ratio given by
additional messages sent by a node compared to the simple
tree scheme.
1) SMA : A sensor node sends p messages each time it does
a reading. It would send one with the simple tree scheme.
Therefore, the overhead of the SMA scheme is p − 1 per
reading.
2) DMA : A sensor node with the DMA scheme sends
p messages each time it does t readings. With simple tree,
it would send t messages. Thus, the overhead of DMA is
p−t
t per reading. Note that the overhead is null when p = t.
This corresponds to the situation where all the shares are
needed to reconstruct readings. This is a consequence of
DMA’s space efficiency: when there is no data redundancy,
there is no overhead. Furthermore, this means that there is
no protection against DoS attacks. More generally, DMA’s
overhead is solely due to data redundancy. Choosing the
amount of redundancy, that is, the ratio α = pt fully determines
the scheme’s overhead.
3) A-DMA : A sensor node with the A-DMA scheme sends
p messages each time it does t − 1 readings. With a simple
tree scheme, it would send t − 1 messages. Therefore the
overhead of the DMA scheme is p−t+1t−1 per reading. The
minimal overhead is obtained for the minimal value of p,
that is p = t. As with the DMA scheme, this corresponds
to the situation where all the shares are needed to reconstruct
readings.
Choosing large values of t helps reducing the overhead. One
may choose p = αt for a given α ≥ 1. This would ensure that
at least t(α−1)s nodes could be compromised and still remain
robust to DoS attacks. The overhead then becomes α−1+1/t
1−1/t .
This means that the larger t, the closer the overhead to α− 1
(overhead for the DMA scheme).
Summary. SMA generates the highest overhead, but DMA and
A-DMA’s can be fairly reasonable depending on the chosen
parameters. A trade-off must be made between the desired
amount of data redundancy and the desired communication ef-
ficiency. DMA is space efficient, which means that no overhead
occurs when there is no redundancy. A-DMA is almost space
efficient. On the other hand, despite its higher overhead, SMA
may also be of interest. It provides very strong confidentiality
and may be used in energy-unconstrained sensor networks.
C. Implementation
In this section we detail the implementation of the three
proposed aggregation schemes as well as a number of practical
results. These implementations should be seen as proof-of-
concept for the feasibility of the proposed schemes, not as
complete turn-key solutions.
1) Setup: Custom implementations of SMA, DMA, and
A-DMA have been developed for Crossbow MICAz motes
(see Section II-C) running TinyOS. The operations are
performed over customizable prime integer fields GF (p)
and we used multi-precision computation routines from
TinyECC [17], which are based on RSAREF [18]. The
source codes of the implementations can be downloaded from
http://www-rp.lip6.fr/˜claveiro/secure-aggreg/.
For the sake of simplicity and in order to isolate our
results from any bias introduced by the routing layer, we
used optimized static multipath routing. This layer uses the
default TinyOS link layer, which is not secure enough with
regard to the assumptions taken in this paper. However, thanks
to TinyOS modular design, one may write and use his own
layers for routing and secure-link establishment without being
intrusive.
Once compiled, many parameters impact memory occu-
pancy. Let us consider the size of a GF (p) integer or the infor-
mation dispersal A matrix size. Figure 2 presents the memory
footprints for some typical parameters. SMA’s footprint is
rather good whatever integer field is used (about the half of
a MICAz’s RAM, for instance). DMA and A-DMA’s footprints
are very sensitive to the size of the information dispersal A
matrix. This matrix determines the maximum number of shares
p and threshold t of DMA and A-DMA schemes. For given p
and t parameters one needs a t× p matrix. Some big values,
such as 16× 16 matrices with 64 bits integers do not fit into a
MICAz mote. Other values are however fairly reasonable with
respect to memory occupancy.
The time required for the nodes to perform operations such
as share creation and aggregation is negligible and has never
been an issue during tests.
The aggregation processes work as follows. Nodes sense
some data at regular intervals and push shares toward the sink
using a sequence number. An aggregator node only aggregates
shares having the same sequence number. When an aggregator
node receives a share, it stores the share in a buffer and waits
for other shares with the same sequence number. If other
shares arrive, the node aggregates them and keeps waiting until
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Fig. 2. Implementations’ memory footprints. For the sake of readability,
A-DMA’s footprints are not depicted here. Their RAM consumptions are
identical to those of DMA. ROM occupancy is slightly bigger due to the
required extra code for authentication values computation.
a new share with a higher sequence number arrives or a timer
goes off.
2) Experimentations: We performed both real experiments
and simulations using the implementation described above.
Experiments were done at small scale (six nodes and three-
path topologies) to test the practicality of the schemes. In order
to stress the implementation, we performed simulations using
TOSSIM. TOSSIM is a sensor network simulator that compiles
directly from TinyOS code and simulates the TinyOS network
stack at the bit level. This has the advantage of perfectly
modeling the behavior of the implementation.
We measured the number of messages for different pa-
rameters and schemes of the implementations. We used five
random topologies of forty nodes with one hour of simulation
time. These topologies use sink-rooted node-disjoint trees to
perform multipath routing. Two topologies have four paths, the
others have respectively three, six, and eight paths. Note that
the number of paths does not impact on the measured number
of sent messages, which is solely influenced by parameters p
and t. When there are more shares than available paths, some
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Fig. 3. Number of sent messages w.r.t. schemes.
paths carry multiple shares. When there are more paths than
available shares, some paths are unused. Figure 3 represents
the total number of sent messages among the five topologies
with respect to simulation time. We compare this number with
the number of messages for the simple tree scheme with the
previously described aggregation technique.
We can observe some predictable properties of the schemes.
As previously analyzed, SMA’s overhead is the highest one,
depending solely on the p parameter. Therefore, SMA roughly
needs p additional messages compared to the simple tree
scheme. We can also see that the overhead of information
dispersal based schemes depends on α = pt . It is not a surprise
that A-DMA and DMA exhibit similar performance, with DMA
having a slightly better overhead. Overheads are however a
bit higher than computed in section V-B. As an example, A-
DMA with p = 12 and t = 8 has an overhead of 1 instead
of the predicted 0.7. Also, A-DMA with p = t = 12 exhibit a
small overhead of 0.25 instead of about 0.1. This is due to the
practical considerations that make implementations miss some
aggregation opportunities.
D. Cost vs. Security
Security necessarily implies a cost with regard to some
metric. Some schemes generates overhead in terms of com-
munications, others in terms of CPU consumption, etc. What
is important to define is a solution that leads to the required
level of security at the cost at an acceptable overhead. In this
way, our proposals are very promising. Indeed, by using the
proposed schemes, a network tolerates multiple compromises
without jeopardizing confidentiality, authenticity, and avail-
ability. Thus, the overheads generated by SMA, DMA, and
A-DMA are acceptable. Furthermore, one can customize the
overhead by adjusting the different parameters of the schemes.
Depending on the amount of resources allocated to security,
one may trade-off some security for some communication
efficiency.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we proposed three schemes to secure data
aggregation using multipath routing. They are based on secret
sharing and information dispersal. In the proposed schemes,
sensors split their readings into several shares and distribute
them among several disjoint paths. Upon reception of a mini-
mum number of shares, the sink can reconstruct the aggregated
value.
Depending on the scheme and its parameters, these tech-
niques provide varying levels of resistance to DoS attacks,
eavesdropping, and data tampering. By using secret multipath
aggregation, one can guarantee that a subset of compromised
paths cannot reveal/leak any information about the readings.
This is at the cost of some overhead. By using dispersed mul-
tipath aggregation, one has an optimal overhead but achieves
lower levels of confidentiality. Depending on the application or
scenario, one approach offers more advantages over the other.
To the best of our knowledge, the three proposed schemes
are the first to address node compromises for aggregation
schemes in sensor networks using multiple paths. Future work
concerning these schemes includes modeling the security pa-
rameters’ statistical behavior under the contingency of random
node compromises. It is also possible to generalize and apply
these schemes to contexts other than sensor networks.
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